Cosmology at the Crossroads of the Natural
and Human Sciences: is Demarcation Possible?
Part 1: Introduction by Нестерук, А.В. & Nesteruk, Alexei V.
– 560 –
Journal of  Siberian Federal University.  Humanities & Social Sciences 4 (2011 4) 560-576 
~ ~ ~
УДК 141.201
Cosmology at the Crossroads of the Natural  
and Human Sciences: is Demarcation Possible?  
Part 1: Introduction
Alexei V. Nesteruk*
University of Portsmouth, 
Lion Gate Building, PORTSMOUTH, PO1 3HF, UK 1
Received 4.04.2011, received in revised form 11.04.2011, accepted 18.04.2011
The paper discusses the problem of demarcation between the dimensions of natural and the human 
sciences in contemporary cosmology. In spite of a common presumption that cosmology is a natural 
science, the specificity of its alleged subject matter, that is the universe as a whole, makes cosmology 
fundamentally different from other natural sciences. The reason is that in cosmology the subject of 
cosmological research and its “object” are in a certain sense inseparable. Any study of the universe 
involves two opposite perspectives which can be described as “a-cosmic” and “cosmic”, egocentric 
and non-egocentric. Cosmology involves two languages, namely that of physical causality (pertaining 
to the natural sciences) and that of intentionality (pertaining to the human sciences). On the one 
hand the universe can be seen as a product of discursive reason, that is as an abstract “physical” 
entity unfolding in space and time. On the other hand the universe can be experienced through our 
participation in, or communion with the world understood as the natural context of living beings. 
This dichotomy between reason and experience, abstract construction and concrete participation, 
originates in the essence of human persons understood as unities of the corporeal and spiritual. On 
account of this dichotomy it is hard to set up a strict line of demarcation between the elements of the 
human and the natural sciences in cosmology. This confirms the intuition that any realistic world view 
is incomplete without a knowledge of what it means to exist as a human being. Conversely it is likewise 
impossible to understand human existence without considering its natural setting, that is the universe. 
We conclude that anthropology is incomplete without cosmology and vice versa. 
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Introduction
Contemporary physical cosmology is a well 
established and vast enterprise which includes 
astronomical observations, space programmes, 
research institutions and funding strategies. 
Cosmology develops fast. Every day one discovers 
dozens of new publications on the internet archives. 
Monographs and popular books telling stories 
about the universe, about its study and those who 
study it are in abundance. Cosmological ideas are 
used and misused in science fiction and fiction 
in general. Cosmology becomes a sort of a cult 
reading as if humanity touches upon something 
ultimately sacred and indispensable for its life. 
Cosmology gathers numerous conferences, 
workshops and public lectures resulting in further 
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publications of collective volumes. Apart from 
physical scientists, cosmology attracts historians 
and philosophers of science, as well as millions 
of those who adore science and trust its final 
word on the nature of things. This is a dynamic 
set of enquiries about the world around us which 
constitutes an integral part of contemporary 
intellectual culture. It is exactly the popularity of 
cosmology in mass-media and among ordinary 
people which manifests that it affects a collective 
consciousness of people and has existential and 
ethical implications. Cosmology is involved 
in the dialogue with religion: it becomes an 
arena of theistic inferences and justifications of 
otherworldly transcendence when the results 
of its theories are brought into correlation 
with theological convictions. Contemporary 
cosmologists are often seen as exercising a 
certain priestly role in modern society as if 
cosmological ideas had an immediate existential 
and social impact that would catch and fascinate 
public opinion.
In spite of all these facts cosmologists’ 
confidence in cosmology’s ability to explain 
the essence and contingent facticity of the 
universe is far from being justified. Some 
cosmologists raise doubts whether cosmology 
can pretend to be following rigorously what is 
called scientific method1, understood so that 
all knowledge including mathematical theories 
leads to experimental verification. It is a fact of 
cosmology’s sociology that there are extrapolations 
and conjectures in cosmology’s claims for truth 
which go beyond scientific justification and this 
involves the whole field into an interdisciplinary 
discourse in which the criteria of validity and truth 
are much more vague that those in the natural 
sciences. Correspondingly, the objective of this 
paper is to elucidate the nature of cosmology’s 
claims for the value and truth of its theories in a 
cross-disciplinary context related to knowability 
of the universe and its relation to human agency, 
its history and self-understanding. This will 
be done in the perspective where cosmology is 
treated as a mode of human activity contributing 
to the “infinite tasks” of humanity, its culture and 
spiritual advance. 
Physical cosmology  
and an input of philosophy
Cosmology, understood as part of theoretical 
physics, forms a subject matter that by its 
very nature tests the boundaries and the very 
possibility of scientific explanation. Indeed, 
cosmology describes itself as a science which 
deals with “the universe as a whole”, the universe 
as the all-encompassing, singular and unique 
“object” of cosmology. However the usage of the 
word “object” applied to the universe as a whole 
is problematic simply because the mainstream 
understanding of objectivity does not allow 
the concept of the universe to fit in it. Indeed, 
according to this view the universe consists of 
independent individual things (objects) which are 
embedded in space-time. These things as objects 
are individuals, because they have a spatio-
temporal location, they are a subject of predication 
of properties, and they are distinguishable from 
each other through some properties. The universe 
as a whole cannot be thought as an object (or as an 
individual) because it is as a whole not embedded 
in space-time (it is rather a totality of space 
and time which transcends their characteristic 
features such as extension).2 The universe is 
unique and cannot be distinguishable from 
anything through particular properties because, 
by definition, it comprises everything. The 
predication of the universe as a whole in terms 
of properties is problematic because the universe 
does not attain original givenness in the manner 
characteristic of particular individual things.3 
The constitution of an individual thing as an 
object, that is as a thing subjected to thematisation 
and objectification assumes as a condition the 
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release from “environmental confinement”4 or 
the context in which a thing is looked at. The 
universe as a whole cannot be released from such 
a confinement because, in a way, it is itself, by 
definition, the ultimate environment and context 
for everything.5 Thus the standard meaning of the 
phrase “object of explanation” as if its identity has 
been defined cannot be applied to the universe 
with any ontological clarity.6 But we do indeed 
understand and use this expression “the universe” 
and therefore there must be a manner in which the 
universe is given, a consciousness of the universe 
that bestows sense on such language. This implies 
that before any philosophical deliberation or 
scientific thematisation of the universe, there must 
be experience of the universe as the recognition 
that there is the permanent and persistent in the 
background of change or the variable. There is the 
sense of identity of the universe as an intentional 
correlate of subjectivity, but the identity as ideal 
and unfulfilled. A possible scientifically reductive 
approach to identity of the universe as an inherent 
and non-relational aspect of an entity or a logical 
subject does not clarify the ontological status of 
this identity. Within these, so to speak, existential 
delimiters, the universe of cosmology, being 
thematised, naturally represents the ultimate 
noematic limit in the process of scientific 
exploration and explanation. Nothing further is 
empirically or theoretically accessible to which 
recourse can be made in order to explain the most 
general properties of the universe as a whole and 
the facticity of its own existence.7 In one way or 
another, natural scientific explanation stops right 
there. 
The very existence of the universe turns 
out to be the precondition for physical science: 
the latter describes and explains phenomena 
which take place in the universe as something 
which is already given. This is the reason why 
the universe (as the totality of being) is not itself 
subject to a physical explanation. The phenomena 
with which physics deals have to be present. 
Physics simply takes the existence of its objects 
for granted. The laws of physics are laws that 
hold within this universe; they do not purport to 
be laws that hold across “universes” (which in 
this sense would be universal for many universes 
with different contingent properties), whatever 
that would mean. Physics is not able to enquire 
into the underlying facticity of the phenomena 
within the universe. If this facticity is associated 
with the contingent appearance of phenomena 
(as contingent outcomes of physical laws8) as if 
these phenomena manifest the radical coming 
into being of that which has not been before, 
physics definitely cannot link the being of these 
phenomena with that something (non-being) they 
come from. In other words, physics can deal with 
the manifestations of being but not with the ground 
of these manifestations in “non-being”. It deals 
with something that obeys laws which are already 
in being. In technical philosophical language the 
same idea can be expressed differently: since 
physical cosmology is capable of apprehending 
the interior of the universe, the universe exhibits 
itself as intelligible; but because of the contingent 
nature of this intelligibility (it cannot explain 
itself, otherwise it would not be contingent) the 
universe embodies a semantic reference beyond 
itself. Cosmologists cannot themselves deal 
with this “other-worldly” reference and conduct 
a proper philosophical work. Some physicists in 
an attempt to address the foundational questions 
in cosmology make manifest a “philosophical” 
mode, not because they adhere to a realm of 
“philosophy” but because they do not follow the 
normal ways of theory-assessment in the natural 
sciences. This was the original motivation, for 
example, for inflationary cosmologies which 
aspired to explain away the problem of the special 
initial conditions of the universe responsible 
for the contingent display of the astronomical 
universe. A similar motivation lies in ideas of 
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multiverse. However, these models, having a 
developed mathematical basis and being employed 
for problem-solving, raise philosophical problems 
and need competence and appraisal through 
borrowing methods of philosophy and insights of 
the human sciences. 
One can generalise by saying that on the one 
hand physical cosmology avoids touching upon 
ultimate questions; on the other hand, because of 
the special status of its subject matter, that is the 
universe as a whole, as well as the fundamental 
inseparability of human subjectivity from the 
universe, cosmology is imbued with these 
questions and in order to attend to them one has 
to invoke a philosophical attitude to cosmology.9 
By conducting a philosophical analysis of 
cosmology one can on the one hand articulate 
the qualities of cosmological theory which make 
it scientific, and identify the naturalistic limits 
within cosmological methodology. On the other 
hand, by transcending these limits through an 
enquiry in cosmology’s facticity, one inevitably 
brings cosmology beyond the scope of the natural 
sciences since, de facto, here humanity enquires 
into the facticity of its own historically contingent 
subjectivity. Philosophy here manifests itself 
as a method of enquiry into the sense-forming 
activities of human subjectivity in the subject 
area of the universe as a whole.10 However, since 
philosophers do not have a supply of knowledge 
about nature in advance, on which they can draw 
or to which they should refer, it would be wrong 
to take the philosophy of cosmology as dealing 
with issues independently of the research going 
on in physics and mathematics. But in spite 
of the obviousness of the fact that the origin 
of scientifically motivated facts lies within 
cosmologists’ thinking, the sense of cosmological 
ideas and their significance for the constitution of 
the noetic pole of the enquiry (that is for human 
subjectivity), exceeds the scope of the natural 
sciences and thus requires an appeal to the 
methods of those sciences which are not restricted 
in their scope to the causality of nature. 
The special status of cosmology  
as a natural science:  
from substance to manifestation
The special status of cosmology among 
natural sciences is determined by the decisive 
factor that its subject matter is unique and cannot 
be represented as an outside object, so that there 
is a fundamental inseparability of the enquiring 
intellect and the universe as a whole. Said 
philosophically, the universe enters all forms 
of human cognition as the ultimate horizon of 
contexts.11 Here we are confronted with a question 
about the status of cosmology as a natural science. 
In an attempt to study some particular aspects 
of these contexts cosmology exhibits certain 
features of the human sciences in the sense that the 
humanly made choice and emphasis of topics of 
investigation through their naming, methods and 
goals have a genetic historical priority over the 
post-factum made non-egocentric claims about 
the reality of the universe as if it is in itself. The 
same is true with respect to any part of physics. 
However, the seeming epistemic priority of the 
human element in cosmology is linked to the fact 
that the human world (or the “premise-world”) 
associated with the conditions of embodiment has 
object-noematic priority over all “other worlds”, 
for cosmology, unlike other sciences, has to 
predicate that reality which is far away in a generic 
sense from the premise-world. This predication is 
being made not only as a bottom-up explanation 
(that is based on ascending series of physical 
causation from the macroscopic empirical 
phenomena to the additive totality), but also as 
a top-down inference based on the workings of 
the intentionality of human subjectivity.12 This 
intentionality includes, for example, the very idea 
of the universe as the overall totality. From the 
point of view of empirical physics the invocation 
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of this idea is optional. Correspondingly the idea 
of the origin of the universe does not proceed from 
earthly physics: it enters the discourse through 
an intentional interrogation into the ground of 
the universe’s facticity, an interrogation which is 
not part of the enquiry into physically causality, 
but rather is a philosophical quest for the sense 
of being. To understand, in an existential sense, 
intentionality invokes intelligible, invisible 
entities in order to “explain”, or more precisely, 
to interpret the phenomenal. Cosmology in this 
respect provides an endless chain of illustrations. 
When we accentuate the presence of the 
language of intentionality in cosmological 
discourse we effectively involve physical 
cosmology (which is by its status a science of 
the abstract, and detached from human reality, 
universe) in the context of the human affairs, thus 
exhibiting in a characteristic way that intrinsic 
ambivalence in cosmology which originates in 
the paradoxical human condition as “both being 
a subject of the world and being an object in 
the world”.13 Being a subject of the world man 
articulates the whole universe on the grounds of 
its existential inference of its commensurability 
with the universe. Being an object, human being 
realises its insignificance for the whole universe 
and thus its incommensurability with it. It is the 
sense of commensurability which is embedded 
in cosmologist’s intentionality of believing in 
and predicating of the universe as a whole. And 
it is the sense of incommensurability which is 
implied by cosmologists’ physical embodiment 
that advances their search for the structure of the 
universe based on physical causality. In spite of 
its paradoxical standing this twofold perception of 
the interplay between humanity and the universe 
reflects an inevitable feature of any disclosure of 
being by human agency. In this sense the unity 
of opposites in this paradox is still preserved 
by the uniqueness of humanity as the centre of 
disclosure. Correspondingly any pretence of sheer 
objectivity for the knowledge of the universe as a 
whole is blatantly incorrect so that a simple relief 
from this tension would be to conjecture that 
the content of cosmological knowledge (that is, 
astronomical facts and theories of the universe as 
a whole including its alleged origins) should be 
considered not as contraposed and “transcendent” 
to human subjectivity, but as transcendentally 
constituted. In other words cosmology itself must 
be seen as part of the transcendental discourse, that 
is the discourse of the conditions which allow the 
universe to manifest itself (in particular, through 
mathematical expressibility). Correspondingly 
one should make a subtle distinction between 
the principles which coordinate knowledge of 
the universe and those connecting principles 
(expressed mathematically) which state the 
relation between the properties of objects which 
are already constituted. It is this transcendental 
constitution which, being restricted by the outer 
universe through the stabilisation of patterns of 
thought, has a fundamental human origin in the 
very act of its intentional launching, that is an 
expression of interest and participation in that 
which gives itself for being constituted. 
Seen in such a way the intended “subject 
matter” of cosmology (the universe in its totality) 
exceeds the scope of the physical sciences for it 
refers not only to the content of what has already 
been manifested, but to the conditions of this 
manifestation which are not part of the physical 
description per se. Seen in this perspective only, 
the phenomenal universe is a sort of a static image 
in the ongoing process of manifestation. By its 
constitution, physical cosmology provides us with 
a particular, logically and physically accessible 
pattern in the interpretation of the universe which, 
however, does not exhaust the whole sense of 
human presence in the universe as the condition 
for its manifestation.14 The transcendental sense 
of cosmological discourse arrives from the 
recognition that the universe is not that which is 
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manifest, but that it is the manifestation related 
to humanity. In this sense the universe is always 
our universe. By its sense the discourse of the 
universe as the manifestation has to comprise 
not only the current scope of observations and 
theories about the universe, but the whole history 
of formation of views on the cosmos as well as 
all philosophical and theological issues on the 
conditions of knowledge of the universe, the telos 
of this knowledge and its value. The universe as 
manifestation implies a constant participation or 
communion with it which is tantamount to saying 
that the universe as manifestation means life.
The conditions of manifestation of the 
universe which are always implicitly present 
behind its empirical appearances and theoretical 
representations yet escape an explicit constitution. 
They reveal themselves through an excess of 
intuition over logical simplicity and mathematical 
thoroughness which delivers the paradoxical 
sense of presence of the universe, the sense which 
is never disclosed in discursive terms thus leaving 
one with an immanent awareness of the universe’s 
absence. Put differently, the universe is, but there 
is no answer to the questions “What is it?” The 
incompleteness of any physical description of the 
universe brings us to that stance in knowledge 
which is called “apophaticism”, that is a mode of 
experience in which that which is intended to be 
signified through discursive description is never 
exhausted through its signifiers.15 The ambiguity 
of the presence in absence of the universe deprives 
a genuine cosmological project of any flavour of 
foundationalism understood as an epistemological 
correlate of the notion of an ontological ground 
be it the constituting subjectivity of the self, 
or the outer universe as underlying substance. 
Cosmology has to function in the conditions of 
the classical paradox of human subjectivity in 
the world which arises in this context and points 
to the fundamental difficulty in attempting to 
formulate the ontology of the universe in terms 
of ground-grounded relationship. The universe 
as manifestation thus escapes any accomplished 
definitions and descriptions and, because of this, 
human subjectivity itself is being constituted 
through its openness to the universe to the extent 
it cannot comprehend the universe. One sees thus 
that cosmological discourse (as a mode of the 
natural sciences) cannot pretend to be complete 
without recourse to the essence of the agency 
disclosing the sense of the universe, that of human 
beings. 16 
The nature of manifestation  
and ontological commitment
In some cases cosmology claims the existence 
of things on the grounds of theoretical consistency 
and a fit with other plausible constructs, but for 
which we can have no observational evidence 
(that is, the principle of direct correspondence 
with empirical reality is not applicable).17 Such 
a situation, for example, happens in the extreme 
case of the construct of the multiverse18, where 
no direct observational or experimental tests of 
the hypothesis are possible, and the assumed 
underlying physics is probably untestable in 
principle. These possibilities do not by themselves 
prove correct epistemic justification, even less do 
they point to the truth-content of what theories 
claim. It is seen that here a sort of philosophical, 
that is trans-scientific insight is invoked. 
In the case where cosmology predicates 
things beyond their verification through 
correspondence it appeals first of all to the 
method of extrapolation (understood in a wide 
sense) which itself must be evaluated as tacitly 
committed to a sort of realism grounded in belief 
of the efficacy of extrapolation. Philosophically 
and scientifically the problem of extrapolation 
arises from those limits of scientific explanation 
which are set by the observational constraints 
inherent in our earthbound home-place. All that 
is in principle directly accessible to observations 
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is positioned on the surface of the past light-cone 
with its apex on the planet Earth.19 Outside that 
cone one has the uncertainties of extrapolation.20 
Thus the extension of a cosmologist’s insight 
into the universe from earth, in the attempt 
to encompass the universe in a single vision 
(including its absolute origin), requires an 
inference from what is already known to what is 
as yet only conjectured. For a form of knowledge 
that rests its claim on its empirical, observation-
based, access to the world (most of the natural 
sciences), these limits raise clear difficulties. 
One could claim that “extrapolations” 
(inferences) towards the fundamentally non-
observable and untestable are simply physical 
hypotheses that are assessed along a variety of 
lines including observational tests as one of them. 
These hypotheses may rely on appeal to analogy, 
on consistency with other cosmological contexts, 
on logical fertility and explanatory force, or a 
mathematical consistency and elegance. Over 
time they may be woven into a more and more 
tightly connected set of beliefs and ideas, each 
element of which derives support from the set 
as a whole.21 One can claim even further that 
extrapolations in cosmology itself (whatever 
this means, including a shift of “home places”22 
in the cosmological principle, or a free eidetic 
variation23 of the parameters of the whole world 
which happens in theories of multiverse) implies 
an extended sense of “scientific justification”, 
for example epistemic coherence which does 
not necessarily refer to tests and observations. 
This, in turn, entails a different commitment to 
realism. 
For example, in the models of origin of 
the universe, the major presumption is that one 
can extend the laws of physics (comprehended 
by us through mathematical formulae) towards 
something which can not be physically 
independent of its mathematical gestalt. In other 
words, such an extension presumes effectively a 
set of beliefs that it is possible to catch the sense of 
reality beyond the sensible (corporeal, in a sense 
of physical equipment as extension one’s bodily 
function) as its efficacious identity (which could 
be either on the level of the alleged substance or 
on the level of ideal forms) through time in spite 
of the postfactum resistance of reality to this.24 
The validity of these beliefs can only be justified 
on the grounds of their coherence as well as, to 
a lesser extent, agreement with that border-line 
physics which through observation is linked to 
the empirical validation. The situation when 
justification is linked to beliefs is dealt with by 
that part of contemporary epistemology which 
is called the coherence theory of epistemic 
justification and which holds that a belief is 
justified to the extent to which the belief-set 
of which it is a member is coherent25; what is 
at issue in a coherence theory is a matter of a 
proposition’s relation to other propositions, and 
not its ‘coherence’ with reality or with the facts 
of matter. 
Now we see that it becomes a task for 
philosophy to discuss the various sorts of 
hypothetical extrapolation that cosmologists 
make as a regular part of their work and the 
implied philosophical beliefs which drive them. 
As a matter of illustration let us refer to the 
basic assumption underlying the very possibility 
and foundation of modern cosmology, that is 
the principle of uniformity of space-time and 
matter (cosmological principle) which is based 
in extrapolation (in the certainty of a belief in an 
indifferent location of humanity in the universe) 
that the average isotropic picture of the large-scale 
distribution of matter in the universe as observed 
from the Earth can be transferred to all possible 
locations (thus implying spatial homogeneity).26 
This extrapolation makes manifest a certain 
philosophical and, may be, even a theological 
commitment which acts in the cosmologist’s 
mind as a regulative and indemonstrable belief.27 
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The implication of this belief in cosmology is a 
particular causal structure of the global space-
time of the universe; that is, this belief as an 
act of intentionality cascades down to physical 
causality. 
Another illustration comes from inflationary 
cosmology: it confesses a belief that there exists 
a field Φ (inflaton)28, which is described through 
a corresponding theory and which drives the 
evolution of the universe during the very early 
inflationary period. This belief coheres (as 
justification) with another scientific conjecture 
(belief) that there was a period of evolution 
of the universe with an exponential growth in 
time which, in turn, solves some problems of 
radiation-dominated cosmology29 and hence 
makes the so called standard cosmological 
model even more coherent. One must stress here 
that all beliefs surrounding the construction of 
a quite sophisticated theory of the inflationary 
universe are driven by the hidden desire to 
explain away the contingent facticity of the 
initial conditions of the universe as well as its 
present display. Contingency as eventuality and 
historicity is not a part and parcel of physics 
and thus here we observe a certain “pseudo-
theological” commitment to overcome the 
“latent horror of the unique event.”30 A similar 
situation occurs with the idea of the multiverse. 
Since no correspondence with empirical reality 
is possible, all speculations about the multiverse 
work in the certainty of belief that there is an 
extended meta-reality which comprises our 
universe, so that any justification for a theory 
of such a multiverse can only be based on the 
grounds of epistemic coherence, which is related 
to convention at the level of the community 
of cosmologists. The fact that the idea of the 
multiverse is driven by a pseudo-theological 
commitment to justify this universe through 
the reference to the transcendent can easily be 
detected by pointing to the by no means rare 
discussions on how multiverse competes with 
the idea of creation of the universe ex nihilo 
by God.31 In the case of the multiverse, in fact, 
no realistic reference is even required. We deal 
here with a situation where the mental states 
(of cosmologists) affect our sense of reality and 
even contribute to its theory. 32 The idea of the 
multiverse can be approached from a different 
point of view if considered phenomenologically 
as an eidetic variation of the parameters 
pertaining to the actual universe. This variation 
takes place within human subjectivity and aims 
to articulate some apodictic features of that state 
of affairs which accounts for this actual universe 
(as a unique event). In this case the invocation 
of the idea of the multiverse is a legitimate 
phenomenological procedure in order to reaffirm 
with a new force the inevitability of the given 
contingency of this actual universe. But certainly 
in this case the causation which is implied by the 
model of multiverse is of a rather mental kind, 
so that the analysis of conscious states becomes, 
in a sophisticated way, the datum of scientific 
facts and cosmology as such becomes a form of 
phenomenological explication of the working of 
human subjectivity.
We see thus that the effectuation of 
the coherence of epistemic justification in 
cosmology (which implies a communal or 
transcendental dimension in cosmology) leads to 
a different stance on ontological commitment in 
cosmological discourse. Cosmology is now seen 
as an enquiry into the condition of appearance 
of the universe, attaining reality such as it gives 
itself to be apprehended by human beings and 
their communities, the very reality of the world 
in which every sensible entity, astronomical 
objects, physical bodies including human beings 
themselves find their place and their meaning. 
However, this discourse of the appearance 
does not deal much with a description of what 
appears at the level of observational astronomy 
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and constructs of theoretical physics, but in a 
more profound sense with a characterisation 
of the very conditions (related to the reality 
of the human) which govern the possibility of 
appearance (manifestation) of the universe. 
In other words, it is not, properly speaking, a 
discourse of the phenomena as such (related to 
knowledge of facts about the universe), but a 
discourse of the process of phenomenalization of 
the universe. In a traditional mode of language a 
discourse pertaining to the conditions in which 
the phenomenon constitutes itself as phenomenon 
is called transcendental. By becoming more 
and more conscious of its constraints and 
possibilities (as related to the place of humanity 
and its communities in being), the discourse of 
philosophy of cosmology becomes more and more 
a transcendental discourse. Correspondingly this 
discourse reveals itself not only as the discourse 
of the universe, but as a discourse of human 
beings. 
By being engaged in the discourse of the 
universe as a whole human beings themselves 
are involved into and subjected to the process 
of their phenomenalization: on the one hand 
they take it as their task to control this 
process through advancing (astronomical) 
praxis dependent upon their theories; on the 
other hand the universe remains that overall 
context and horizon of all horizons which 
escapes constitution by discursive reason 
so that it is rather human subjectivity that 
is constituted by the universe to the extent 
it cannot comprehend the universe. In this 
sense cosmology represents not so much 
that which is manifest, that is the universe as 
such, but the manifestation, the manifestation 
which involves the universe and conscious 
human beings into the endless constitution.33 
Cosmology reveals itself as a contributor to 
the phenomenological project, as realization 
of a transcendental discourse. 
Phenomenological insight  
in cosmology as explication  
of the human 
A phenomenological insight into cosmology 
makes a reversal of its meaning by shifting the 
centre of its enquiry from the noematic content 
(that is related to object) to its noetic pole (related to 
subject), that is the generating human subjectivity. 
When scientific reason attempts to enquire into 
the origin of the universe in an absolute sense 
the strategy of extrapolation acquires some 
features of philosophical transcendence. But here 
transcendence is not through physical causation 
(this would be an impossible break beyond 
the immanent), but through retaining in the 
background of all physical representations of the 
universe, in terms of stages of its evolution, an 
excess of the universe’s intuitive donation in the 
act of life. Transcendence points towards a simple 
truth that the reality of the human embodied 
condition in the universe is not exhausted by 
those physical aspects which position humanity 
as temporally and spatially insignificant and 
hence incommensurable with the universe.34 
Correspondingly cosmology, if it is narrowed 
to the physical and expressed mathematically, 
cannot account for the ultimate sense of the 
universe because it cannot account for the 
ultimate sense of the human.35 Since no science 
can give such an account, the question here is 
about the boundaries of the human in science. 
The atomic bomb, for example, being a human 
creation, characteristically points towards the 
inhuman, that is to the limits of humanity as such. 
Thus the atomic bomb as a scientific achievement 
defines in an apophatic (negative) way the sense 
of the human. Cosmology plays a similar role: 
it provides some hints and pointers as to where 
human comprehension and articulation of the 
universe becomes paradoxically inhuman (the Big 
Bang, for example). In this sense the cosmology of 
the Big Bang becomes a characteristic, although 
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apophatic, explication of the sense of humanity as 
that formation in being which is looking for its own 
origin and its own history.36 A phenomenological 
insight into the sense of cosmology as explicating 
humanity’s quest for itself thus compensates for 
the incompleteness of cosmology and reinstates 
its human creator to its ontological centeredness 
in disclosing and manifesting the universe.37 At 
the same time the limits of physics and scientific 
philosophy, tested through cosmology, in fact test 
the limits of humanity to understand its own sense 
of existence. The incomprehensible universe 
invokes in the human scientific mind humility 
and discernment in order to realise the limits 
of its pretensions to knowledge of the universe 
which resists disclosure and exceeds the capacity 
of understanding.38 
Since cosmology assessed, phenomeno-
logically, retrieves the “natural” centring of all 
non-egocentric tendencies of its world-building 
narrative in human hypostatic subjectivity, this 
assessment indirectly calls into question the 
purported neutrality and objectivity of some of its 
claims with respect to realities which are beyond 
empirical verification. It could suggest instead that 
such “neutral” descriptions of the world operate 
on the basis of existential concerns formulated in 
a set of beliefs (or myths, which may or may not 
be related to the faith of theology).39 In this sense 
the phenomenological stance rejects the view 
that cosmological knowledge describes the world 
in itself40; rather these descriptions are seen as 
interpretations that are governed by beliefs which 
can be qualified as controlled to the extent that they 
are related to a particular path of science in human 
history.41 For example, if one is to understand and 
explain the past of the universe as constituted 
through human history, one must conceive it 
in terms of past possibilities of this history 
rather than as a defined and finished product. 
In this case the cosmologist’s own historical 
consciousness is involved in “archaeology” of 
the universe and, in analogy with historical 
science, cosmological discourse reveals itself 
as a form of consciousness which humanity (as 
community) has of itself.42 By revealing the telos 
in the historical path of cosmological explanation 
(as related to the representation of the ultimate 
origin of the universe)43, phenomenological 
analysis discloses the hidden “theological 
commitment” in cosmological research, meaning 
that the beginning and the end of the universe 
in human thought is just a mode of this same 
thought speaking of its own beginning and its 
own consummation implying a transcendent 
reference. Seen from a slightly different angle 
this “theological commitment” corresponds to 
an attempt to know and see the universe as “all 
in all”, as that primary existential memory in the 
human constitution which drives cosmological 
research.44 
Regardless of possible scepticism with 
respect to objectivity and neutrality, scientific 
cosmology remains an extremely important 
and useful instrument in demonstrating just 
how human embodied subjectivity affirms 
itself through the non-egocentric tendencies of 
its “natural” attitude. The universe that science 
depicts as something different from us and 
devoid of our influence and presence, represents 
in fact the articulated words and thoughts of 
humanity. By creating a cosmological narrative 
we affirm ourselves in a non-trivial sense.45 
Indeed, by creating a physico-mathematical 
narrative cosmologists loose control over 
the intentions they are driven by, since the 
introspection upon their creation is not in the 
focus of scientific enquiry. To understand the 
“data” lying behind this narrative one must 
consider it as manifestation of an expressive act, 
that is to move from their given meaning to their 
giving meaning, from their pure phenomenality 
to the intentional life which generated them. By 
predicating the evolving universe and attempting 
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to phenomenalise the mystery of its contingent 
origin, human subjectivity employs that 
intentionality which effectuates the telos of human 
subjectivity’s ever-going incarnation as “coming 
to presence” assigning thus a dynamic character 
to personhood’s manifestation.46 As expressed by 
M. Munitz: “The goals of cosmology are goals of 
human beings”. However, the universe as such 
benefits from these goals: “Through the measure 
in which they are reached, the universe becomes 
understood, perhaps for the first time anywhere 
throughout its vast stretches in space and time” 
(Munitz, 1951, p. 338). By reflecting the goals 
of humanity, cosmology exhibits the traditional 
features of all mythologies, namely that the 
perceptible aspects of the universe are expressed 
in terms of human social, behaviorial and 
existential concerns. In this sense the picturing 
of the universe as a historical process cannot 
avoid containing erratic facts associated with 
the human condition, to be more precise with 
the intimacy of personal communion with the 
universe and the extent of not being attuned to it. 
Any imaginable attempt to disregard these facts 
and assess cosmology only on the basis of law-
like ordered concepts would be incomplete and 
historically inadequate: in this case cosmology 
would provide us only with a fringe of the 
universe’s phenomenality. The other “part” of 
the universe’s phenomenality which reflects the 
erratic fact of not being attuned to the universe is 
rather reflected in poetic and artistic depictions 
relying on ecstatic act of personal being in the 
universe as communion. This only confirms an 
already formulated view that cosmology cannot 
dispense with anthropology, not only in a high 
philosophical sense, but in the mundane sense 
of human affairs. 47 The so called mythological 
aspect of any cosmology thus naturally arises 
from the intention to interpret erratic features of 
the human universe through a reference to the 
astronomical order and it is this aspect that brings 
with a new force a “coherence” dimension in its 
epistemic justifications which was mentioned 
before: indeed mythologies never present gaps 
in their “explanations” and are invoked by the 
communities of adherents on the ground of 
coherence of their claims. 
1 A careful analysis of methodological weaknesses in cosmology has been done in a paper of George Ellis (Ellis, 
2007). 
2 The word “object” cannot be legitimately applied to the universe because the universe as a singular and self-contained 
whole cannot be detached from human insight and thus positioned as something which is outside and devoid of the hu-
man presence. There is a fundamental inseparability between the universe and the knowing subject who is always a part 
of the universe. Another problem emerges from the universe’s uniqueness which cannot be set among other universes. 
The modern view of the universe as developed from a singular state (Big Bang) which de facto encodes the universe in 
its totality invokes a counter-intuitive sense of the universe as a singular, that is unrepeatable event (not an object!) with 
respect to which the natural sciences experience the sense of fear and desire to explain it away. Edgard Morin expressed 
the idea that the cosmos reveals itself as the universe and event. On the one hand the physical universe constituted through 
regular repetitive features, on the other it is a singular event as phenomenon, the phenomenon which evolves for more than 
ten billion years. The temporal unfolding of the universe which appears to human contemplation lies indissolubly in the 
advent-event (avènement-événement) of the world (Morin, 1982, p. 120).
3 It is because of the inseparability between the human observer and the universe that the conditions of the universe’s ob-
servability and mathematical expressibility are constitutive of the very concept of the universe. In this sense the “physical 
objectivity” of the universe cannot bear an independent reality in a classical sense. Indeed, unlike in classical physics, the 
basic conditions of the constitution of the universe as a whole have not been permanently available and thus have to be 
questioned (Cf. Bitbol, et al. 2009, pp. 4, 18.) 
4 Terminology of M. Heidegger (Heidegger, 1998, p. 413).
5 Here one sees an original sign that cosmology in a way has some features of the human sciences, because it is known that 
the release from environmental confinement is not necessary for thematisation and objectification in the human sciences, 
where a perspective on reality is crucially dependent on the researcher’s intentionality originating in the existential and 
socio-historical condition (and thus cannot be environmentally free). Applied to cosmology this would mean that if one 
implies that the in-itself of the universe (as its identity) be studied, it must preserve this identity as free from any change 
through the release from environmental confinement, that is from the inherent subjectivity of a knower of the universe. 
6 C.f. Theses A1 and A2 in (Ellis, 2007, p. 1216.)
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7 This was always realised by cosmologists themselves. As an example one can refer to D. Sciama’s interview of 1978 
where he underlined the existence of a borderline between the ultimate questions about the universe’s facticity and the 
exploration of its properties: “None of us can understand why there is a Universe at all, why anything should exist; that’s 
the ultimate question. But while we cannot answer this question, we can at least make progress with the next simpler one, 
of what the Universe as a whole is like.” (Quoted in (Kragh, 1996, p. xi). 
8 However the very contingent appearance of things in the universe points towards the laws whose outcomes supply these 
appearances: there must be these laws in order to have these particular things. It is difficult to separate in the universe as 
a whole between its factual (material) and nomic (law-like) features. In this sense one can talk about facticity of physical 
laws themselves as linked to the boundary or initial conditions in the universe. See, for example, in this respect (Balashov, 
1998, pp. 147; 2009, pp. 269-277).
9 It is this mentioned inseparability which makes the cosmological idea (that is the idea of totality of the world) fundamen-
tally different among other ideas of reason, such as the idea of soul or the idea of God. Kant wrote that neither psychologi-
cal nor theological idea entail contradiction and contain antinomies. (Kant, 1933, A673/B701). Practically this means that 
one can easily deny the existence of a soul (let us say, on materialistic grounds) or deny the existence of God (on atheistic 
grounds). However it is impossible to deny the existence of the universe for it would deny the empirical world of sense 
which is part of the universe and which contains the foundation of all knowledge about universe. The antinomian nature 
of reasoning about the universe originates exactly here: by being in the sensible world one cannot disentangle from the 
universe, at the same time the universe as totality is never fully materialised in the world of the senses. 
10 The fact that the encounter with the problem of the universe as a whole represents more an epistemological issue than 
anything which can be associated with the natural sciences, was understood long before by such thinkers as Nicholas of 
Cusa and Kant. The very concept of “learned ignorance”, which amounts in modern terms to the apophaticism of knowl-
edge in general, and which had been drawn from astronomical-cosmological considerations, had most of all an episte-
mological meaning pointing toward the limits of reason and puzzles which it has to encounter while dealing with such a 
limiting concept as the universe. (See, for example, (Koyré, 1958, pp. 5-19). A similar sense was attached by Kant to his 
famous cosmological antinomies, which were indications of the fundamental paradoxical structures of reason rather than 
any constructive theories of the universe. Here is a characteristic quote from a contemporary treatise on Kant: “Because 
reason examines itself in order to extract laws from within itself, instead of simply greeting these laws, the cosmological 
antinomy is the place where the innermost depths of our humanity manifest themselves. In the antinomy, nature speaks to 
our inquiring minds in the most direct possible way, precisely because, as a complete whole, it is exposed to the danger of 
being lost in obstinacy or despair.”(Kerszberg, 1997, p. 101). 
11 Here, in analogy with Husserl’s definition of the “world-horizon” the universe as such is never given in a manner pertain-
ing to ordinary objects. The universe as a horizon of all contexts in the physical and mathematical enquiry in the structure 
of the world cannot be an object and is distinct from any object given in the background of contexts. The universe is coper-
ceived as the necessary horizon of all individual beings (astronomical or terrestrial) which are immediately experienced. 
(Husserl,1977, pp. 70-73); see also (Steinbock,1995, p. 104.) 
12 This distinction can be elucidated by a quote from a paper of C. Harvey: “It is common parlance to say that whereas the 
natural scientists seek to explain, the human scientists seek to understand. This distinction between understanding and 
explanation, however is itself predicated upon the deeper distinction between intentionality and causality. If the natural 
sciences rely upon physicalistic causality as the human sciences rely upon intentionalistic motivation, and the intention-
alistic motivation is shown to be prior to causal rationality, then natural science will be shown to be posterior to, because 
ultimately explainable in terms of, human scientific motifs”. (Harvey, 1995, p. 125. Emphasis added).
13 This paradox is a perennial problem of philosophy and was anticipated by ancient Greek philosophers and Christian think-
ers. It was express differently by such philosophers as Kant (see, for example, Kant’s conclusion to his Critique of Practi-
cal Reason.) Among phenomenological philosophers who dealt with this paradox one can mention E. Husserl, M. Scheler, 
M. Merleau-Ponty, E. Fromm and others. The general discussion of this paradox can be found in (Carr, 1999). The decisive 
role of this paradox in discussion on science and theology can be found in (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 173-175). Applied to the 
study of the universe the paradox of human subjectivity can be formulated as follows: on the one hand human beings in the 
facticity of their embodied condition form the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe as a whole, modelling 
it as overall-space and time which exceeds the limits of the attuned space related to humanity’s comportment on the planet 
earth (the home place). On the other hand the depicted universe as a vast continuum of space and time positions humanity 
in an insignificant place in the whole totality making its existence not only contingent (in physical terms) but full of non-
sense from the point of view of actually infinite universe. Said bluntly the actual infinity of the universe is attempted to be 
articulated from an infinitely small part of its formation. One could express this differently: through its insight humanity is 
co-present in all points of what it observes in the universe, or imagines while physically being restricted to an insignificant 
part of it. Cosmology as the discourse of the universe as a whole brings one face to face to a general philosophical objec-
tive of avoiding any sort of foundationalism in knowledge of the universe which insists on the ground-grounded relation 
between humanity and the universe leading either to an idealistic reduction (subjectivity as the ground of the world) or 
to a materialistic, mathematically deterministic diminution of consciousness to illusion. In either mode of reduction the 
reality of the ground absorbs the grounded and the grounded is reduced to the categories of the ground. To avoid these 
reductions, the embodiment, as a premise of the person’s grasp of the world, must be rather considered as that “over here”, 
where a particular and immediate indwelling of life and the universe comes to presence. It is this coming to presence that 
determines that “place” which constitutes person as a centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe. 
14 This concerns first of all the dimension of personal (hypostatic) embodiment. Indeed the discursive or linguistic expres-
sion of experience of the universe does not rule out the immediate corporeal presence of the universe on the level of sheer 
consubstantiality between human beings and the universe. Correspondingly if this dimension is overlooked then the per-
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ceived inability of cosmology to make results personally meaningful can be alienating and frustrating for non-specialists: 
for example, the sheer insignificance of humanity on the cosmic scale can create a sense of anxiety and despair related 
to the meaning of human life. However cosmic physics does not exhaust the sense of the human experience of space, or 
astronomical objects. Our experience of the universe as that mysterious environment with beautiful night skies and warm-
ing presence of the life-giving sun exceeds and is much richer than just knowledge of astronomy or solar physics. The 
problem is that the formalised and mathematised science sometimes has the effect of de-legitimising and de-appreciating 
other ways of communion with the wonders of space. (Nieman, 2005, pp. 383-388). 
15 One can mention that the “apophatic” conviction applied to some limiting situations in cognition is well known in history 
of philosophical and theological thought. Generalising this conviction towards knowledge in general, C. Yannaras de-
scribes “as “apophatic” that linguistic semantics and attitude to cognition which refuses to exhaust the content of knowl-
edge in its formulation, which refuses to exhaust the reality of things signified in the logic of signifiers (Yannaras, 2004, p. 
84). In philosophy, for example, it originates from an epistemological argument pertaining to a sort of linguistic reformu-
lation of the Kantian transcendentalism (which is typical for post-structuralism) that language conditions the accessibility 
and intelligibility of reality. In this approach the very phrase “there is” points to a referent which the very language cannot 
capture because the referent is not constituted by language and by definition is not the same as it linguistic effect. Accord-
ing to this view there is no access to the referent outside the linguistic effect, but the linguistic effect is not the same as 
that referent it attempts but fails to capture. This situation entails, in analogy with theology, a variety of ways of making 
such a reference, where none of which can claim it exclusiveness and true accessibility to what the reference is made. A 
phenomenological philosopher J. Ladrière, without using the notion of apophaticism, points towards the same feature of 
any knowledge, more precisely to the apophaticism of that fashion in which the human existent approaches the encounter 
with the world. An object is never a pure reference to itself, but is also a revelation of the fashion of its comprehension. 
(Ladrière, 1970, pp. 448, 450). The range of cognitive situations which fall under the scope of apophaticism can be found 
in works of J.-L. Marion under the name of “saturated phenomenon”. See (Marion, 2002).
16 C.f. “A philosophy of nature and a philosophy of man are mutually complementary;… neither can be completed unless it 
shows itself as the counterpart of the other”, (De Laguna, 1966, pp. 81-82).
17 This, for example, can be related to the cosmological principle which postulates uniformity of the universe beyond ob-
servational limits. Another example is a famous “inflaton” field which drives the exponential expansion of the early uni-
verse. 
18 Multiverse proposals in cosmology refer effectively to the old idea of the plurality of worlds understood either in a physical 
sense as an ensemble of worlds with all possible physical conditions, or a variety of mathematical structures which have 
or do not have their incarnation in the physical. In this case the existence of our universe in its contingent facticity is ex-
plained away through a reference that it simply belongs (in a generic sense) to an ensemble of universes which through its 
totality contains whatever is possible. (The literature on the multiverse is vast, as an example see a paper (Tegmark, 2003) 
or a book (Carr, 2007) with a variety of papers on different aspects of the multiverse debate.) In all multiverse proposals 
the question of existence, that is of the contingent facticity of this universe, is thus quite illegitimately transferred to the 
question of selection, whereas the issue of the existence of the multiverse itself cannot not addressed at all for obvious 
philosophical reasons. 
19 There is a tiny piece of the human observer’s world line which relates to the immediate cosmic environment like the earth, 
planets in the solar system, stars in our galaxy which, in terms of cosmic times and thus space, are “close” to us so that 
their separation from us is in a way “commensurable” with the humankind’s life span. We assert the existence of such 
objects in terms similar to those of the earthly objects. 
20 Thesis B1 in (Ellis, 2007, p. 1220). 
21 See, for example, (McMullin, 1994, pp. 119-120).
22 This is the terminology of E. Husserl (Husserl, 1981).
23 On eidetic variation in phenomenology see e.g. (Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 177-84).
24 This is a longstanding point made in (Meyerson, 1964). 
25 See, for example, (Dancy,1989, p. 116).
26 There are discussions at present that the universe may not be uniform at large and that the observed uniformity is the result 
that we are centred in a sort of void. 
27 Discussing the cosmological principle in close connection with the so called Copernican principle, E. McMullin points 
out that the Copernican principle has to be understood in terms of what it rejects, namely older teleological beliefs about 
the uniqueness of the human and the likelihood that humanity has a selected position in space, for example being a 
cosmic center.( McMullin, 1993, p. 373). However the desire to abandon the teleological explanation is itself based in 
intentionality, rather than any scientifically demonstrable conviction. The indifference postulated by the cosmological 
principle is indemonstrable because it itself lies in the foundation of the very possibility of scientific demonstration applied 
to cosmology. Thus it is based in the belief in knowability of the universe which has a different motivation in comparison 
with that one of teleology (but related to the latter). 
28 In spite of the fact that the hypothesis of this field, its very existence, is very efficient in a qualitative and quantitative 
modelling of observable phenomena, the physical nature of this field, that is its relation to a certain class of observed 
particles, remains obscure. This is one of the major points of scepticism with respect to inflationary theories, which has 
been raised, for example, in the abovementioned paper of Ellis (Ellis, 2007, p. 1210). (See a similar point made in (Penrose, 
2005, p. 751) and in (Weinberg, 2008, pp. 202, 217)).
29 These are famous horizon, monopole and flatness problems. See e.g. (Weinberg, 2008, pp. 201-208). See also (Penrose, 
2005, pp. 753-57), in what concerns a certain critique of the inflationary hypothesis.
30 C. f. (Torrance, 1996, pp. 166-7). 
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31 See, for example, discussion of this issue in (Leslie, 1989), (Temple, 1994), (Stoeger, 2007), (Collins, 2007).
32 This thought was anticipated by Henry Margenau who believed that modern physics could provide an evidence that the 
nature of its reality is determined not only through causation in empirical reality, but also through intentional acts of 
thought. In his approach to the nature of physical reality he posed a question: “Is sensed nature the only field of departure 
or arrival in the process of scientific verification, or will inspection of the eidetic structures of consciousness function in 
a similar way as dator of scientific fact?” (Margenau, 1944, p. 278).
33 C.f. (Ladrière, 1972, pp. 169, 173, 176). 
34 In the context of the so called anthropic inference this was pointed out by (Bitbol, 1993). In a wider philosophical and 
theological context this excess of humanity beyond nature was discussed in (Nesteruk, 2001). 
35 The cosmic environment provides the necessary conditions for human corporeal existence (and this is exactly detected in 
anthropic arguments) whereas the sufficient conditions do not belong to the sphere of physics and point towards human 
morality, ethics and some eschatological commitments. See discussion in (Nesteruk, 2003, pp. 200-214). 
36 One can point to similarities between the phenomenology of birth and the aspirations of cosmologists to disclose the sense 
of birth (origin) of the universe. See (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 247-66). “Is there not, when we read it sufficiently profoundly, 
an analogy between the deep structure of nature and the structure of human existence as openness, creativity, possibility 
of accord with the event? The problematic of nature can thus be linked with the problematic of human existence.” (J. 
Ladrière, 1972, p. 186). 
37 The idea that a research into the underlying sense of science leads to enlightenment of the ways and telos of the human 
spirit was clearly formulated by many phenomenological philosophers starting from Husserl. Here is a quote from J. 
Ladrière: “The detail of the life of science must […] be investigated in order to know something of the nature of reason and 
of its becoming…The destiny of reason is outlined […] in the incessant comings and goings that define the life of science. 
It is in the patient advance of its history that its finality reveals itself” (Ladrière, 1970, p. 455).
38 The phenomenological construct of “presence in absence” can be easily applied to cosmology. For example: we see the 
universe back in time along the so called past light cone, so that the inference about the universe outside this cone can be 
considered as an attempt to deal with the universe as a whole which is present in its empirical absence. A similar thing 
can be said if one remembers that according to present-day model the visible matter represents only 4% of the whole 
material content of the universe. The other 96% (dark energy and dark matter) is postulated in order to balance the model 
with observations. In other words the universe is present to us through 4% of what is visibly manifested but in empirical 
absence of the 96%. 
39 A basic and unavoidable structure of any cosmological myth, including its contemporary scientific arrangement is the 
duality between the factual and empirical on the one hand, and the intelligible (as allegedly stable and underlying) on the 
other hand. See e.g. (Ladrière, 1972, p. 153). 
40 As it was eloquently expressed by A. Gurwitsch, “the goal of phenomenology is not an exhaustive description of an infinite 
variety of immanent data, but the investigation of those contexts of consciousness owing to which there is a perceptible 
world, the universe of physical constructs, etc.” (Gurwitsch, 1992, pp. 43-44).
41 It is the presence of this concrete path of science which confirms our previous stance on cosmology as the working of 
constitution, that is a re-enactment of the production of the world. To clarify this point one can quote another paper of J. 
Ladrière: “The theoretical apparatus is thus not a description in the ordinary sense, as presentation of an entity, supposedly 
given, and of its properties, it is the characterisation of something which is not a thing, but a structural path along which 
a thing comes, from the ultimate horizon of every givenness, to the actual presence in which it is effectively given to 
apprehension.” (Ladrière, 1989, p. 138). (Emphasis added.) 
42 C.f. (Aron, 1938, p. 80).
43 See (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 250-254; 2009, pp. 78-81).
44 Physical cosmology makes it clear that the world line of the human observer starts at the Big Bang, so that whatever we 
have on our physical content is directly related to that undifferentiated something lying in the foundation of all possible 
form of mater in the universe. 
45 See, e.g., (Swimme, 2005, p. 7), (Mathews, 1991, p. 5), (Kline, 1977, p. 423). 
46 C.f., (Heelan, 1972). See also in this context (Compton, 1967, p. 82).
47 As was provocatively conjectured by an author from the camp of the human sciences and arts, we need “a sort of “mytho-
scientific, neo-anthropomorphic” theory, one that would stay operational by combining the findings of mainstream science 
with conjectures based on mythological thought. This type of theory would map features of the universe through images 
taken from the domain of human social behaviour….Although anthropomorphic theories might not be operational, they 
can lead to a better understanding of the universe.” (Friedman,1993, p. 361).
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Космология на перекрестке естественных  
и гуманитарных наук: возможна ли демаркация?  
Часть 1. Введение
А.В. Нестерук 
Университет Портсмута 
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг, ПОРТСМУТ, 
РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В статье обсуждается проблема демаркации элементов естественных и гуманитарных наук 
в космологии, понимаемой как дисциплина, занимающаяся изучением вселенной как целого. 
Акцент сделан на феноменологическом анализе предпосылок космологии, подчеркивающих 
ее исторически случайный характер, связанный с положением человека в космосе. Одним 
из тезисов является предложение понимать космологию как отчасти гуманитарную 
дисциплину, изучающую человека. Точнее то, что познавательные структуры физической 
вселенной в естественно-научной дисциплине космологии неявно эксплицируют структуры 
человеческого субъекта, озабоченного пониманием своего положения в мире. В этом смысле 
исторически-случайный характер естественно-научной космологии дополняется абсолютным 
и универсальным содержанием, относящимся к проблеме человеческого.
Ключевые слова: космология, философия, вселенная, познаваемость, человек, соучастие, 
манифестация, феноменология, верования, когерентность объяснения.
